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Abstract. Multi-agent system research is concerned with the issues surrounding
the performance of collections of interacting agents. A major concern, therefore,
is with the design of the decision making mechanism that the individual agents
employ in order to determine which actions to take to achieve their goals. An
attractive and much sought after property of this mechanism is that it produces
decisions that are rational from the perspective of the individual agent. However,
agents are also inherently social. Moreover, individual and social concerns often
conﬂict, perhaps leading to inefﬁcient performance of the individual and the sys-
tem. To address these problems we propose a formal decision making framework,
based on social welfare functions, that combines social and individual perspec-
tives in a uniﬁed and ﬂexible manner. The framework is realised in an exemplar
computational setting and an empirical analysis is made of the relative perfor-
mance of varyingly sociable decision making functions in a range of environ-
ments.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of applications are being implemented as multi-agent systems
in which individual agents interact with one another in pursuit of both individual and
system goals. When building such systems, a number of fundamental design questions
continually arise: what underlyingmotivations should the agents possess to achieve the
required overall results?; how should agents make decisions given that they inhabit a
multi-agentenvironmentand that their choices effect others?; and to what extent should
individual agent autonomy be sacriﬁced for global concerns? Answers to these basic
questions are needed if robust and reliable agent-based systems are to be developed.
To build successful applications, designers need their agents to be rational and to
do the right thing [20]. To this end, a major strand of research has adopted the eco-
nomic viewpoint and looked at self-interested agents [10] that consider what action to
take solely in terms of its worth to themselves. However, this is only part of the story.
When an agent is situated in a multi-agent context, its actions can often have non-local
effects. For example, the actions of different agents can conﬂict or result in duplication
of action. This can lead to undesirable results and inefﬁcient utilisation of common re-
sources. Consequently, the beneﬁts, to both the individual and the overall system, of
a more social perspective on decision making are beginning to be realised [4,12] andnotions of social rationality [15,14] are emerging. This notion of socially acceptable
decisions has long been of interest in the ﬁeld of socio-economics [9]. However, to
date, there has been comparatively little cross fertilization with agent based computing
research. To help rectify this situation, this research seeks to examine the link and use
its insights to explorethe conﬂict between individualand social concernsin multi-agent
systems.
In addition to balancing individual and social concerns, agents typically need to op-
erate in a resource bounded manner. They do not have unlimited time or computational
resources. Moreover, such bounded rationality should be responsive to ﬂuctuations in
the amount of resources available. Hence, agents should be able to modify how they
make decisions based on their current context. In our case, this means agents should
be able to dynamically vary their balance between individual and social considerations
dependingon the amount of resources available in the system. Moreover,because com-
puting the social effects of action choices consumes resources, agents need to be able
to vary the effort they expend on this task. Thus, when resources are plentiful an agent
may wish to expend a signiﬁcant amount of effort computing the social implications
of an important choice. However, when resources become scarce, the same agent may
choose to adopt a computationally cheaper approach to the same decision.
As a ﬁrst step towards this long term vision, this paper investigates, in an empirical
fashion, the feasibility and performanceof socially rational decision making. We deﬁne
a decision making framework based on work found in socio-economics that explicitly
characterises how agents can determine which action to perform in terms of a balance
between individualand social concerns.By being explicit about the constituent compo-
nents, the framework provides the ﬂexibility to enable agents to dynamically tune their
operationin orderto be as rationalas possible in the prevailingcircumstances.Inpartic-
ular, this paper extends previouswork in two main ways. Firstly, it describes a marriage
of socio-economic and agent-based techniques to investigate how social reasoning can
be effectively employed by an agent situated in a multi-agent system. Secondly, it stim-
ulates ideas as to how social reasoning agents may be controlled in times of resource
constraints, allowing inroads to be made in the construction of socially rational, re-
source bounded reasoners.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the socially
rational decision making framework and introduces the multi-agent platform used in
our empirical evaluation. Section 3 describes the experiments we performed to assess
our hypotheses about socially rational decision making. Related work is discussed in
section 4, followed by the conclusions and future work in section 5.
2 Balancing Conﬂicting Needs
To date, the dominant decision making philosophy in agent design has been to equate
rationality with the notion of an individual maximising a self-biased utility function.
Thus, an agent’s motivation is the maximisation of beneﬁts with regards to its own
goals. However, in a multi-agent setting, for the reasons outlined above, a more social
perspective on decision making is often desirable. Traditionally, this has been achieved
by making the overall system the primary unit of concern. This has the consequenceof subordinating an agent’s autonomy to the needs of the system. For this reason, we
believe such top-down approaches fail to exploit the full potential of the agent-oriented
approach; therefore we propose an alternative means of achieving the same end. Thus
we wish to build agents from the micro to macro level, but still retain the beneﬁts of a
more social perspective.To this end, our approachis to incorporatean element of social
consideration into each agent’s individual decision making function.
One means of achieving good system performance from the micro level is to in-
corporate all the necessary social information into a single, amorphous utility function.
This is the methodthat would be followed by advocates of traditionaldecision theoretic
approaches. However, such an approach conceals important details of how (and why)
the agent actually reasons. Such details are not only important for the analysis of agent
behaviour, but also provide a vital tool to designers when building complex systems.
Therefore we advocate an approach that provides detailed guidance as to how social
agents may be constructed.
Making the theory of social decision making ﬁner grained in this manner is also
essential for progress on the issue of bounded social rationality. Here, parallels can
be drawn between conceptions of meta-reasoning [19] and the idea of controlling the
amount of social reasoning that should be performed by contracting and expanding the
set of acquaintances the agent considers in its reasoning.
2.1 A Social Decision Making Framework
In order to ascertain the social impact of an action, an agent needs to be able to deter-
minethevaluethata state(as a resultofanaction)has forotherindividualsandpossibly
for the whole society. To do this, the agent needs to empathise with what others value
(i.e. know how others value states and be able to make interpersonal comparisons).
In this case, the social decision framework developed here builds upon and extends
the idea of social rationality proposed by Jennings and Campos [15] and is based on
Harsanyi’s social welfare function [13]. Social welfare functions were ﬁrst introduced
by sociologists and they deal with choice by a group of individuals in a society. The
decision maker can either be a group making a joint decision or an individual making a
choice that has global consequences. The general theory of social welfare is formalised
as follows. A set of individuals I
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InHarsanyi’sformulationofsocialchoice,eachindividual’spreferencesarerepresented
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal utility function
u
i that obeys the standard
axioms of Bayesian rationality [21]. Hence, in equation (1) the preference function
P
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where
 
i represents the weight given to agent i’s utility function in the overall equa-
tion. To be socially rational, an individual maximises W over the different alternatives.
This function represents how an individual agent may judge states of the world from
a moral or social perspective by taking into consideration the beneﬁt to others of its
course of action and weighing it against its own beneﬁts. Harsanyi [13] has shown that
his social welfare function satisﬁes the following important postulates. Firstly, the util-
ity functions of all the individuals satisfy the axioms of rational behaviour under risk.
Secondly, the social preference function (
P
I) also satisﬁes these axioms. Finally, if all
individuals are indifferent between any two alternatives, from the viewpoint of their
personal preferences, then an individual j will be indifferent between them from the
standpoint of its social preference function. This provides an invaluable link between
conceptions of individual and social rationality.
Our work adopts the basic mechanism of social choice deﬁned in equation (3) (al-
though see [17] for variants) as the means of ensuring that individual agents make so-
cially responsible decisions. Using this formulation of social welfare, an individual has
two separate preferenceorderings:its individualpreferences (indicating an agent’s own
preference structure); and its social preferences (representing what an agent believes is
best for the society in which it is situated). The task of analysing how the agent de-
cides what action to perform can be formulated by differentiating how the agent makes
decisions in terms of what it expects to get out of the action itself and what effect the
action has on others. The effect that an action has on other agents can be determined by
examiningtheir utility functions. This is a feasible method for agent systems consisting
of tens of agents,which is our primarytarget.However,when the numbergrowsto hun-
dreds or even thousands, agents will have large acquaintance sets and the calculation of
all the necessary utility functions will be computationally prohibitive in most cases. In
such circumstances, the agent will need to control this calculation by considering how
resource bounded it currently is (see section 5 for a further discussion of this point). A
further potential difﬁculty with the approach we have advocated stems from the inclu-
sion of the acquaintances’ utility functions. In an ideal world, each agent would know
the utility function of all the other agents. However, in practice this is infeasible. Thus,
in the formulation given here each agent uses an approximation,
u
 , of what it believes
the other agents’ utility functions to be. In terms of the balance between individual and
social needs, equation (3) can be re-written as:
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By setting the weighting of a speciﬁc utility function to zero, an agent can eliminate the
inﬂuence of that acquaintance on its decision making. For example, setting the agent’s
own weighting
 
i to zero removes any personal utility beneﬁt consideration from its
decisions. In this way, the agent can tailor its function to give more weighting to eitherindividual or social concerns. Thus we can say at a coarse level, equation (4) becomes:
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where
 
s
o
c is the weighting given to the social utility part of the function. To gain a
perspectiveon the feasibility of using such a mechanism in practical systems, the above
decision making function has been implemented in a multi-agent testbed and evaluated
as follows.
2.2 The Experimental Domain
The decision making framework was evaluated by applying it to the Phoenix ﬁre ﬁght-
ing multi-agent simulation [8]. Here, the park is policed by several ﬁrebosses, each of
which is responsible for a speciﬁc geographic region. Firebosses control a number of
ﬁreﬁghting resources (bulldozers), that can be exchanged as and when necessary. The
goal of the ﬁrebosses is to prevent ﬁres claiming too much land. Hence, the success of
an agent, and the utility it achieves, is measured as a function of land loss. The system’s
overall utility can also be measured in this way (i.e. land lost in the whole park). In
order to use the framework described in section 2.1, we assume that the agents’ util-
ity functions are comparable1.Aﬁreboss can estimate, given the current environmental
conditions, how a ﬁre is likely to spread and it can therefore choose the most effec-
tive allocation of its ﬁreﬁghting resources. These projections provide the agent with
a means of determining the likely outcomes of different courses of action. Thus, for
example, an agent can ascertain whether asking for a loan of resources from another
ﬁreboss is likely to be proﬁtable. This choice is affected by the uncertainty of the reply
of the other agents, and hence the decision maker will use a probability distribution
based on whether the agent believes that i) there is a ﬁre in the other agent’s part of the
park; and ii) whether the other agent is likely to give resources if it is possible for it to
do so.
In what follows, we assume all agents are motivated towards the goal of reducing
the amount of land lost as a result of ﬁres. If an action results in a large land loss, then
that action has less utility in comparison with an action that produces lower land loss.
Attainingmoreresourcesallowstheagenttocompleteﬁghtingtheﬁremorequicklyand
so is preferred to simply ﬁghting the ﬁre with its current resources. However, asking
for extra resources from another ﬁreboss decreases that ﬁreboss’s effectiveness (and
utility) when it is faced with a ﬁre of its own. Therefore agents need to be able to
estimate the likely utility of a particular resource distribution to their acquaintances
in terms of predicted land lost in their region. Agents do this by assessing whether a
ﬁre is likely to occur in the acquaintance’s area of the park and what effect particular
resourcedistributionswillhavefortheagentinthiscontext(basedontheacquaintance’s
estimated utility function). This is then used in equation (5) to determine which action
is socially preferred.
1 This is acceptable if we assume that the agents’ utility functions are comparable up to an afﬁne
transformation [9].To illustrate the nature of social decision making in Phoenix, consider a scenario
involving three agents (A, B and C)2, each of which has control over two bulldozers. If
a ﬁre breaks out in A’s area, A must decide whether to ask B or C for extra resources or
proceed to ﬁght the ﬁre with its current resources. By obtaining an extra bulldozer, A
will probably reduce the amount of land it loses and hence increase its utility. However,
taking a bulldozer from B or C reduces their ﬁreﬁghting power and hence decreases
their expected utility in the event of a ﬁre. In addition, sharing bulldozers involves
overheads based on the time it takes to communicate, as well as the delay of waiting
for the extra resource(s) to arrive. Furthermore, A is not certain that its request will be
granted, hence time may be wasted if its request is refused. Against this background,
A’s decision can be formulated in the following manner:
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u
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considerations detailed above, such as the likelihood of success and the communication
overheads involved in requesting a bulldozer. Each agent uses a discrete probability
distribution to represent the likelihood that a resource request is accepted. Initially all
agentsusethesamedistribution,buttheseareupdatedovertimeasaresultofinteraction
and resource exchange between the agents (e.g. when resource requests are accepted or
rejected). Agent A will compute similar formulations for its other options (ask B and
ﬁght the ﬁre with current resources) and then select the action that maximises the social
welfare.
3 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Social Decision Making
Our aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of different decision making attitudes under
varying levels of resource pressure. To this end, the experimental control variables are:
– The utility function weightings
 
i and
 
s
o
c (from equation (5)). These values can
be altered to implement a wide range of decision making strategies. Here we use
the following values:
  0:1Selﬂess: care nothing about their own utility. These agents will not
ask for help, but will grant anyresource request that they receive(provided
they are able to do so);
  1:0Selﬁsh: care only about their own utility. They will ask for resources
from others, but will not loan out their own resources;
  0.5 : 0.5 Balanced: place equal concern on individual and social needs;
  0.25 : 0.75 Social tendency: are more social than selﬁsh;
  0.75 : 0.25 Selﬁsh tendency: are more selﬁsh than social.
2 For reasons of clarity, the example scenario considers just 3 of the systems’ agents– The number of ﬁreﬁghting resources each agent controls (1, 2 or 3 bulldozers. In
this context, 3 represents as many as the agent ever needs to ﬁght a single ﬁre);
– How fast each ﬁreboss can make a decision (slow, medium or fast).
Resource pressure is exerted by: (i) altering the number of resources an agent con-
trols and (ii) manipulating how quickly an agent can make its decisions. A given simu-
lation run involves specifying when and where ﬁres occur, how large they are initially,
and what the environmental conditions are (wind speed etc.). Each run is randomly
generated, involving between 2 and 6 ﬁres. Statistically signiﬁcant results are obtained
by averaging over 12 runs. There are six ﬁrebosses in these experiments; although this
number represents a fairly small multi-agent system, it nevertheless provides a reason-
able indication of the feasibility of our decision making mechanism.
Two broad types of experiment were carried out. Firstly, ones where all agents used
the same decision making attitude (section 3.1). This is to ascertain the performance
proﬁle of the various attitudes under varying resource constraints. Secondly, those in
which agents have different attitudes (section 3.2). This is to ascertain the robustness
of the decision making attitudes against a range of heterogeneous opponents. In all the
experiments, individual utility is measured as a function of land lost and system utility
is measured as a function of the land lost in the entire park. The latter is calculated as
the aggregation of the land lost by all the ﬁrebosses.
3.1 Homogeneous Agent Societies
These experiments seek to test the following hypotheses about social decision making:
1. The performance of the self-biased attitudes (selﬁsh, selﬁsh tendency) will deteri-
orate, both at the individual and system level, as the number of resources in the
system are reduced;
2. The performance of the society-based attitudes (selﬂess, balanced and social ten-
dency) will slowly degrade as resources are reduced, but not as much as the self-
interested types;
3. Balanced agents will achieve the best system level performance since their deci-
sions are based upon the welfare of the whole system.
Figure 1 shows how the average individual performance, for one sample agent, of the
different agent strategies is affected when resource pressure is exerted on the system.
Runs using different rates of thinking (the other form of resource pressure) produce
similar results, but because of space limitations are not shown here. It can be seen
that self-biased agents, as predicted in hypotheses 1, perform poorly in times of scarce
resources. This is because they waste time trying to obtain extra resources when i) it is
perhapsunnecessaryand ii) the system is comprisedof agents of the same type that will
not provideassistance in any case. Furthermore,we can see their performancedegrades
more rapidly than those with social tendencies as stated in hypotheses 2.
The selﬁsh tendency strategy is better than the purely selﬁsh one because requests
for extra resources are only made if they are likely to have a noticeable beneﬁt. The sur-
prising result is that agents with a social tendencyperformvery badly in times of scarce
resources. This is due to the fact that in times of scarce resources when resources aremore valuable, these agents are likely to ask for help since the value of those extra re-
sources outweighs any social considerations it has. However, the acquaintances are less
likely to loan out their resources as it is too costly for them on an individual basis. This
introduces a delay in the ﬁre ﬁghting and so means more land is lost. Balanced agents
perform well since all utilities are considered equally and so the costs of asking for
resources and loaning them out play an important role in the decision. This means bal-
ancedagentsaskforandloanoutresources,butonlyifitis clearlybeneﬁcial.Intimesof
plentiful resources, the performance of the different types becomes less disparate since
agents generally have sufﬁcient resources to minimise the impact of social interchange.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative land loss of the entire system. Here, agents with social
Fig.1. Individual Agent Performance.
tendencies generally perform well as they explicitly attempt to assess the system wide
implication of their choices. We can also see that balanced agents perform the best (hy-
potheses 3) as they work towards overall utility maximisation. However, selﬂess agents
perform worse than the balanced or social tendency agents because they miss the op-
portunity of attaining available resources from elsewhere (cf. balanced/social tendency
attitudes). They do, however, perform better than the self-biased strategies as they do
not waste time asking for resources unless they really need to (i.e. when they have no
resources) and simply get on with the task at hand.
Fig.2. System Performance.3.2 Heterogeneous Agent Societies
To investigate the performance of a system comprising of agents using different strate-
gies, the runs described for homogeneous societies were repeated using different per-
centage mixtures of the various strategies. In particular, different percentages of selﬁsh
agents(25%,50%and75%)wereintroducedintosocieties oftheotherdecisionmaking
attitudes with the resourcepressurekept at a constant level. We are especially interested
in the impact of selﬁsh agents since these should have the greatest detrimental effect on
the performance of socially rational societies. To this end, we wish to explore the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
4. The performance of selﬂess agents will decrease rapidly as more selﬁsh agents are
introduced;
5. The performance of balanced agents will be resilient to the introduction of selﬁsh
agents;
6. Mixing selﬁsh and socially motivated agents in one society may produce system
performance that is superior to that of the homogeneous societies of either type.
Figure 3 shows two graphs: (a) shows both the average individual performance of self-
less and selﬁsh agents in societies in which the percentage of selﬁsh agents is steadily
increased; and (b) a similar graph, but with societies that are a mixture of balanced and
selﬁsh agents. The individual performance of both the selﬂess and the balanced agents
suffer as the number of selﬁsh agents is increased. However, the balanced agents are
less susceptible to the increase in the numberof selﬁsh agents since they have an inbuilt
concern for their own utility (hypothesis 5). This means they will not unquestioningly
give resources to others if they can proﬁt from retaining them. It can also be seen that
the performance of the selﬂess agents decrease more rapidly than the balanced agents
as more selﬁsh agents are introduced (hypothesis 4).
Fig.3. Individual Performance in (a) Selﬁsh/Selﬂess and (b) Selﬁsh/Balanced Societies
Figure4 demonstrateshowthe mixedsocieties performona system level.The grad-
ual introduction of more selﬁsh agents decreases overall system performance for both
mixtures. However, the society consisting of balanced agents shows a more steady de-
cline in performance than the one containing selﬂess agents. Again this occurs because
balanced agents are more concernedfor the overallsystem and not just for individualoraltruistic concerns.One pointto noteis the initial performanceimprovementof the self-
less/selﬁsh society.When thereare a small numberof selﬁsh agents,and severalselﬂess
agents willing to accede to requests, overall performance improves since resources in
the system are being distributed more effectively than would be the case if the system
consisted solely of selﬂess agents. This can be related to hypothesis 6 where we ex-
pected that system performance would actually improve with some mixtures of agents.
As the number of selﬁsh agents increases, however, there are fewer opportunities for
these agents to gain resources, so performance again deteriorates.
Fig.4. System Performance of Heterogeneous Societies.
4 Related Work
Rationality has been widely debated and studied in the ﬁeld of agent research [20].
Decision theory [23] has emerged as the dominant descriptive and normative theory of
rational decision making. The fundamental principle of decision theory is the maximi-
sation of the agent’sutility functionundercertainaxioms ofuncertaintyandutility [18].
Game theory is also concerned with the rational behaviour between two or more inter-
acting individuals [22]. Each agent has a payoff or utility function that they attempt
to maximize based on the information they have about the strategy of the other indi-
vidual(s). This payoff function represents the preferences of the individual, though it
can be based on altruistic motives in the case where more global/social concernsare the
dominantphilosophy.Thereare, however,a numberof problemswith gametheorywith
regards to the social aspects of decision making. One is the inability to deal adequately
with some social notions such as cooperation [5]. In fact, without the introduction of
some binding force ensuring cooperation, the theory can produce sub-optimal results,
as shown by the prisoners dilemma example. Furthermore, although both game and de-
cision theory provide simple and attractive formalisms of individual action choice, they
have been criticised on the grounds that they reveal nothing about the motivations of
the agents making the decisions [5]. For example, both disciplines can produce socially
acceptable results if the utility functions used incorporate some social information, but
these theories provide no answers as to how this can be done or even why this should
be done. This, in turn, is of little use when attempting to understand, describe and ul-
timately build socially aware agents. Thus, we adopt some fundamental principles of
these theories but expand these ideas to explore our ideas of social reasoning.A consistent theme in the work of Castelfranchi [4,6] is the concept that sociality is
derived from the individual mind and social action. Social rationality, and in particular
an agent’s social power, is described via manipulation of dependence relationships be-
tween agents. Agents may interfere, inﬂuence and adopt goals of their acquaintances as
a result of the manipulationof these relationships. Such notions can then form the basis
of a variety of social actions. Although underlining the need to explore and emphasise
the social aspects of an agent’s make-up, this line of work addresses the philosophical
rather than practical questions of how this should be achieved. Building on this, Cesta
et al. [7] explore the practicalities of social decision making by experimenting with a
variety of social attitudes. Their work mainly covers simple, rather rigid, agent systems
and concentrates on how the introduction of exploiters into a society effects system
performance. Their results are consistent with our ﬁndings regarding the introduction
of what we have called selﬁsh agents. When exploiters (selﬁsh agents) are introduced
into their system, the performance of the system decreases, a result which is magniﬁed
as resource pressure is exerted. Although they look at some effects of resource bounds,
this is not the main thrust of the work. Also, there is no discussion of how individual
autonomy is balanced with social concerns in such contexts.
Boella et al. [1] use the concept that a group of agents working together will have
a group utility function that is shared amongst the members of the group. It is assumed
that all members know of this function and believe that the other agents in the group do
as well. This functionis combinedina weightedsumwith the agent’sotherpreferences,
for example personal interests not related to group activity, and determines whether an
agent chooses to act towards group interests or towards its own goals. Their approach
resembles ours in the way that a form of weighting is applied to the agents’ different
interests, but it differs in that they chose to address the problem of multi-agentplanning
and do not seem to address concerns of scalability and resource boundedness.
In [3], Brainov deﬁned a range of social decision making strategies that differ in
their attitudes towards other agents: altruistic agents consider other agents in their deci-
sion making;self-interested agents never considerother agents when making decisions;
and envious agents consider others, but in a negative sense. In [2] he extends this work
by comparing the use of these different attitudes in multi-agent planning and negoti-
ation. Our different social attitudes follow his basic deﬁnitions, but are grounded in
a particular utility conﬁguration: that of Harsanyi’s welfare function. This provides a
means of moving the theory into practice and allows us to begin our investigations into
resource bounded social agents.
Using the SPIRE (Shared Plans Intention-REconcilation) agent framework, Glass
and Grosz investigate how a social commitment incentive scheme, what they call the
Brownie point model, affects agent performance over time [11]. An agent makes a de-
cision based on a weighted combination of the actual value of doing the task and the
brownie points it is rewarded. They manipulate this weighting to produce agents that
are more group committed by giving a higher weighting to the brownie points part of
the function. Their results show that agents striking a balance between group commit-
ments and monetary gains perform better than ones who have a high level of group
commitment. They also look at how environmental factors inﬂuence the performance
of agents under this model, but admit that further analysis and empirical investigationis needed. Like the social rationality work presented here, they experimentwith various
social strategies, but differ by examining the effect on performance of how much time
the agent is committed to group tasks.
Jennings and Campos [15] deﬁne a social equivalent of Newell’s conceptualisation
of individual agent rationality that they term the Principle of Social Rationality. Social
rationality is deﬁned as the action choice of an individual based on global concerns.
To add substance to this deﬁnition, Kalenka and Jennings [16] describe several so-
cial attitudes that can be ascribed to agents under this principle. Their work provides a
framework for deﬁning the different social attitudes that an agent may possess, includ-
ing helpfulness and cooperativity. However, the missing element in their work is the
practical consideration of resource bounds on the performance of social agents. Their
framework also restricts the level of analysis that can be performed with regards to an
agent’s different relationships in the society. For instance, there is no mechanism to
employ when the agent ﬁnds itself as a member of multiple groups or coalitions.
Moresocially mindeddecisionmakingattitudeshavebeeninvestigatedin thesocio-
economicliteratureundertheumbrellaofsocialwelfarefunctions(alsocollectivechoice
rules or preference aggregation rules) [9]. Here the main emphasis is on how a group
of agents can collectively make decisions. The decision maker can either be several
agents making a joint decision or an individual making a decision that has global con-
sequences.Thesefunctionshavebeenshownto havetheadvantageofParetooptimality,
but have the disadvantage that equity is not preserved in the group (i.e. the decision is
notfairto everyone,forexampleinthe caseofthe distributionofwealth).Therearealso
concerns as to how the utility functions are derived and how they should be combined
in an overall function to reﬂect group choice. These issues are also important when
we consider software agents and, at present, there are no comprehensive solutions to
these problems. However, we do believe that practical assumptions can be made about
the origin and structure of the utility functions used by agents, and that with further
experimentation into these issues, useful insights can be found.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has outlined the case for a more socially aware approachto decision making
in a multi-agent context. A novel agent decision making framework, incorporating in-
sights from work on social welfare functions, has been devised to tackle the problem of
social decision making by an individual in a multi-agent environment. This framework
provides a means of describing and analysing how an individual agent may approach
the task of making socially acceptable decisions in a multi-agent system. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, is the empirical demonstration of the effectiveness of various socially
aware decision functions in a range of problem solving scenarios. Our results indicate
that decision attitudes based on social concerns perform better in resource bounded
contexts than the more traditional, self-interested attitudes. In particular, our results for
balancedagents demonstratethe importanceof consideringboth the individualand sys-
tem consequencesof decision making.Furthermore,this work investigatedthe effect of
having several different decision making attitudes in the same system. Here again we
highlighted the importance and effectiveness of basing decisions on both individualand social concerns by demonstrating the robustness of balanced agents in the face of
exploitation by selﬁsh agents. These experiments also demonstrate the importance to
the performance of the individual and the system, of the mixture of strategies used by
the participating agents and how this must be considered in the individual’s decision
making function.
The next step is to utilise our empirical ﬁndings to construct resource bounded so-
cially rational decision makers. Here, the empirical data provides the basic knowledge
about social decision making. The results indicate when the various attitudes are ef-
fective (both from an individual and system perspective). This know-how can now be
used as a basis for the meta-reasoning component of a resource bounded reasoner. In
particular, we are currently embedding the key ﬁndings into the control level of our
Phoenix agents. We envisage that our agents will use the basic social decision function
described in section 2, but to the address problems of resource bounded behaviour they
will: i) dynamically modify the weightings given to the respective parts of the social
welfare function; and ii) alter the amount of computation performed by modifying the
acquaintances used in the calculation. When taken together, this will enable an agent
to adjust its behaviour over different resource contexts. Thus, for example, the agent
may weight its own utility higher than others and only include a subset of its peers in
the social utility calculation in times of heavy resource pressure and when it believes
it can obtain resources from others. This can be seen in the situations as described by
hypothesis 6 when mixtures of different agent strategies distribute the resources more
efﬁciently. However, when the agent has more time or resources to play with, then it
may fully consider all parts of the social welfare function when deciding what to do as
we have seen by the results obtained both at the individual and system level.
In terms of extending our work, we need to further investigate how agents can dy-
namicallybuildrelationshipswithoneanotherandthenusethis knowledgetolearnhow
tooperatemoreefﬁciently.Forinstance,anagentmaylearntoaskcertainacquaintances
for help and not others (e.g. if it has received negative responses to previous resource
requests). Such interaction adaption can also help agents choose which acquaintances
they should consider in the social part of their utility equation. This is especially useful
when the agent is faced with heavy time pressures since it need only perform calcu-
lations for the acquaintances that it deems important. This adaption can also be used
to consider what effect the appearance of coalitions or sub-groups has on the agent’s
decision making strategy.
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